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INTERVENTION IN TAX COURT PROCEEDINGS*
ToBiAs WEIsst
NTERVENTION AS A PARTY may be sought in litigation before the Tax
Court. While not provided for either by statute or court rule,' it has
been found by the court to come within its sound discretion.2 Opin-
ions and advice can be conveyed to the court through briefs amicus curiae,
and, where a proceeding is already pending, the parties thereto may
achieve participation in a second case through consolidation of the two.3
Intervention is usually pressed where consolidation is not available, and
where a more active role in the litigation is desired than amicus briefs
permit.
The typical proceeding in the Tax Court is brought by a taxpayer who
files a petition against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to review a
determination of tax deficiency. Mailing of such a determination by the
Commissioner to the taxpayer is an indispensable condition to jurisdiction
in the court; disapproval of the deficiency is the relief sought; and the tax
liability of no taxpayer other than the petitioner to whom the notice of
deficiency is directed can be ruled on by the court. 4
The main burden on the prospective intervenor, therefore, is to con-
vince the court that, as an outsider whose tax liability is not visibly at
* Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed herein are represented only as those of
the author, and not of the Tax Court of the United States or of any other agency or official of
the federal government.
t Attorney, Tax Court of the United States; Member of the New York, District of Colum-
bia, and United States Supreme Court Bars.
1 Section 1111 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the court to conduct its proceedings
in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure as it may prescribe, and the court has
issued a set of rules of practice. As to intervention in the federal district courts, see Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 24; 4 Moore's Federal Practice, c. 24 (1950); Intervention of Private Parties under
Federal Rule 24, 52 Col. L. Rev. 922 (1952).
Reference to the Tax Court includes its predecessor in name, the Board of Tax Appeals.
2See Central Union Trust Co., 18 B.T.A. 300, 303 (1929).
3 Cf., e.g., Jane C. Grant and Estate of Harold W. Ross, 18 T.C. 1013 (1952); Clarence B.
Ford, 19 T.C. 200 (1952); Carol F. Hall, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 19,346, 19 T.C. No. 57 (1952);
Elise Avery Johnson, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 19,350, 19 T.C. No. 59 (1952). Cf. recommendation
of Section of Taxation, Amer. Bar Ass'n, that several parties be allowed to join in a single
petition to the Tax Court if the same issues of fact and of law are involved in the situations
of all the joined parties. See Program and Committee Reports for Meeting of September 1952
at San Francisco, California 120 (1952).
4 Int. Rev. Code § 272; Rules of Practice Before The Tax Court of the U.S., Rule 6; Mary
M. Shea, 31 B.T.A. 513 (1934); M.A. Nicholson, 22 B.T.A. 744 (1931); Hamilton Web Co.,
19 B.T.A. 199 (1930); cf. Bond Crown & Cork Co., 19 T.C. 73 (1952).
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stake in the proceeding, he ought nevertheless to be allowed a hand in its
conduct. Discharge of that burden has been attempted by showing that
intervention was required to protect interests of the one seeking it, or that
its grant was in the best interests of the functions of the court.
Protection of Parties' Interests. Perhaps the most common situation in
which the interests of the aspiring intervenor have been advanced to jus-
tify his interjection into a pending proceeding has involved a claim that he
was bound to pay such tax as might be adjudged to be owing by the
petitioner. Thus, in Central Union Trust Company,5 the intervenor's obli-
gation was asserted to be contractual, based on an agreement to pay the
death tax assessed against an estate as a result of a specified transaction.
Alleging existence of the obligation, the Commissioner included it among
the estate's assets; both the intervenor and the estate's executors denied
the obligation, although the latter apparently were taking a contrary
position in state probate proceedings. The court noted that "the issue to
be determined is one which arises between the Commissioner and the
executors of the estate and may be fully settled without the presence of"
the intervenor.' Yet it granted intervention, indicating as a reason that
"the intervenor has an interest in the controversy which is contrary to
that of either of the parties and which otherwise might not be protected in
such proceeding."
'7
An obligation to pay another's tax may be imposed by law rather than
agreement. Where a tax is due from a transferor of property and it re-
mains unpaid, the transferee is liable for its payment to the extent of the
value of the property transferred without a "full, fair and adequate".con-
sideration, if the transfer was made while the transferor was insolvent and
after liability for the tax accrued.8 There is authority that a decision on
the transferor's tax, made in a proceeding to which the transferee is not a
party, is nonetheless binding on him in a later proceeding to enforce trans-
feree liability. 9 The transferee therefore has an incentive to intervene
18 B.T.A. 300 (1929). Cf. Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman, 31 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Ill.,
1940), aff'd on other grounds, 119 F. 2d 417 (C.A. 7th, 1941); United States v. Inorganics,
Inc., 109 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn., 1952) (government sought to enforce purported assump-
tion of tax liability on theory of third party beneficiary).
6 Ibid., at 302. 7 Ibid., at 302-3.
8 Int. Rev. Code § 311(a); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); J. P. Quirk, 15 T.C. 709
(1950), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 1022 (C.A. 5th, 1952); Powers Photo Engraving Co., 17 T.C. 393 (1951),
remanded on another ground, 197 F. 2d 704 (C.A. 2d, 1952); Ruth Halle Rowen, 18 T.C. 874
(1952), Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 15 T.C. 566, 573 (1950); Mertens, Federal Taxation
§ 53.10 et seq. (1943).
9 Cf. F. L. Bateman, 34 B.T.A. 351, 363-64 (1936); Isaac Michael Green, 26 B.T.A. 719,
725-26 (1932), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 75 F. 2d 1014 (C.A. 9th, 1935); Nora M.
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when suit is brought to adjudicate the transferor's tax, and the question is
whether there is here a sufficient interest to support intervention. In
Frederic W. Procter,0 trustee-donees attempted to intervene in a proceed-
ing determining the gift tax liability of their settlor-donor. The trustees
asserted that the settlor was not contesting his liability in good faith;
that, if decision went against him, he would be unable to pay the tax; that
the trustees, as donees of his property, then would have to pay it; and
that this would result in the trust being voided. Intervention, opposed by
both the settlor and the Commissioner, was denied by the court, which
concluded that none of the trustees' "substantial rights" would be preju-
diced thereby.
I The court expressed the belief that its decision of the pending proceed-
ing could "not be pleaded as res adjudicata against the trustees in any
action, even one before this Court involving their liabilities for such a
tax."" In view of the authority to the contrary in respect of transferees,
this statement, taken at its face, is difficult to understand; indeed, the In-
ternal Revenue Code provides that "If the [gift] tax is not paid when due,
the donee of any gift shall be personally liable for such tax to the extent of
the value of such gift."' 2 Yet the court may have had good reason to refuse
intervention. The trustees' motion to intervene was not made until the
case had already been tried and was awaiting decision. While the court
expressed reluctance to deny intervention on the ground of lack of dili-
gence alone, it was able, with a little hindsight, to test whether the settlor
actually was remiss or acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case and
whether the trustees, in the evidence they proposed to offer if allowed to
intervene; had anything of significance to contribute. It found the trus-
tees' position unsubstantiated on both counts, and in fact thereafter ren-
dered a decision for the settlor on the merits."3 This case indicates that an
Carney, 22 B.T.A. 721, 724 (1931); J. E. Duval, 21 B.T.A. 1357, 1359 (1931), aff'd, 57 F. 2d
496 (C.A. 5th, 1932); Jahncke Service, Inc., 20 B.T.A. 837, 846-49 (1930), appeal dismissed,
112 F. 2d 169 (C.A. 5th, 1933); First Nat. Bank v. Comm'r, 112 F. 2d 260, 262-63 (C.A. 7th,
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 691 (1940); United States v. Fisher, 57 F. Supp. 410, 414 (E.D.
Mich., 1944); Nebel v. Nebel, 223 N.C. 676, 686, 28 S.E. 2d 207, 214 (1943). See Develop-
ments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 860 (1952).
10 2 T.C.M. 13 (1943).
1 Ibid., at 15. Cf. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 42 B.T.A. 808, 820 (1940), rev'd,
128 F. 2d 745 (App. D.C., 1942).
12 Int. Rev. Code § 1009. Cf. Baur v. Comm'r, 145 F. 2d 338 (C.A. 3d, 1944); Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 141 F. 2d 54 (C.A. 3d, 1944); Alma M. Myer, 2 T.C. 291 (1943), aff'd,
149 F. 2d 642 (C.A. 8th, 1945); Evelyn N. Moore, 1 T.C. 14 (1942), aff'd, 146 F. 2d 824 (C.A.
2d, 1945).
.1 Frederic W. Proctor, 2 T.C.M. 429 (1943), rev'd, 142 F. 2d 824 (C.A. 4th, 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944), on remand, 4 T.C.M. 359 (1945), aff'd, 151 F. 2d 603 (C.A. 4th,
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 785 (1946).
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obligation to pay another's tax, together with other circumstances such as
the taxpayer's failure reasonably to oppose liability, 4 may support inter-
vention, but in itself apparently is insufficient.
In Estate of Arthur Curtiss James,5 it was state rather than federal law
which shifted tax incidence to the intervenor. A New York statute pro-
vided that the federal estate tax was to be prorated between the bene-
ficiaries who succeeded to the estate assets responsible for the tax. 6 The
decedent, alone or together with his wife, created an inter vivos trust for
the latter's sister, and, because of retention of a power of revocation, the
corpus was included in the decedent's estate; it was estimated that about
$53,000 of the estate tax asserted by the Commissioner was attributable
to such inclusion of the corpus. In a proceeding brought by the estate to
review the asserted tax liability, intervention was sought in behalf of the
sister-beneficiary on the ground that she, rather than the estate, was the
party really interested in this portion of the tax because its payment ulti-
mately would be borne by her if the Commissioner prevailed. Neither the
estate nor the Commisioner objected to intervention. Leave was granted
"to intervene herein as a party petitioner solely as to the assignments of
error" 17 dealing with inclusion of the corpus in the estate. Thereafter, the
litigation was carried on between the sister-beneficiary and the Commis-
sioner; the estate, although nominally still a party, neither called wit-
nesses, introduced other evidence, nor filed briefs.
Where the taxpayer held property not owned by him, it was ruled in
Gladys T. Pilts 8 that the owner, in no way responsible for the tax in-
volved, would not be permitted to intervene merely because of a consider-
able danger that the tax might be satisfied out of that property. The owner
alleged that the property had been embezzled by the taxpayer; that the
Commissioner was taxing the loot to the latter as income; that the tax-
payer would not testify to his misdeeds, which represented the real de-
fense to the tax; that the property would be seized to satisfy the tax; and
that the case was about to be settled to the owner's irreparable damage.
In denying intervention, the court said that the owner's fears related, not
to the validity of the tax deficiencies in issue, but to matters of tax collec-
11 Rather than such failure being a fact already transpired, as where the motion to inter-
vene is made after the proceeding has been under way, it may be a matter of inference drawn
at the outset of the litigation, and on this basis the Central Union case supports the conclusion
reached here.
15 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 19,498, 19 T.C. No. 113 (1953). The motion for intervention was
heard on July 11, 1951.
16 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 124. The purpose of the statute was to put the burden of the
tax on those persons or other beneficiaries who received the property responsible for it.
17 See order by Judge Rice granting intervention in this proceeding, dated July 13, 1951.
18 26 B.T.A. 312 (1932). See note 25 infra.
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tion, over which the Tax Court had no jurisdiction and as to which other
protective measures might be taken.
The circumstances of one taxpayer often are similar or related to those
of another, and, when the tax liability of one is being litigated, participa-
tion in the proceeding may be desired by another in an effort to prevent a
decision which, although not res judicata, may yet loom as an adverse
precedent.'9 In the most recent instance of attempted intervention before
the Tax Court, Gulfstream Park Racing A ssociation, Inc., 20 the taxpayer, an
operator of a horse racing track, was organized in 1944, when its entire
common stock was issued for racing plant assets and a franchise. In ques-
tion was the basis of the property paid in for the stock, first in determining
the taxpayer's invested capital, and secondly for purposes of depreciation.
The taxpayer contended that it had acquired the property in a taxable
exchange, and that its basis was the fair market value of the property at
the date of transfer. The Commissioner took the position that the ex-
change was nontaxable; but he was contending, in other pending proceed-
ings involving stockholders of the taxpayer, that it was a taxable ex-
change. Arguing that it was nontaxable, an ex-shareholder applied for in-
tervention in the Gulfstream Park case. The applicant had sold the com-
mon stock acquired in 1944, the basis for which was then being disputed
by the Commissioner in the course of administrative review. There was
not complete identity of interest between the applicant and the continuing
stockholders, in that the latter, still concerned in the corporation, might
make concessions in an over-all settlement based on some benefit to it.
In these circumstances, the court denied intervention, 21 stressing that it
could not make a decision in that case which would be determinative of
the tax liability of the ex-stockholder.
And yet a taxpayer, proximately affected in his own liability by the con-
sequences of a disposition in a closely related case, has some legitimate
concern over the decision of that case.22 The link between the related situ-
19 In addition to strictures of established principle relating to the force of precedent, there
are those of judicial mechanics and mentality. Cf. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1299 (1952). Its own decisions become of special weight
in the Tax Court because of the extent to which the individual judge there speaks, not just for
himself, but for the court as a tribunal. See Int. Rev. Code § 1118.
20 T.C. Docket No. 35, 693 (this case has not yet come on for trial).
21 Intervention was denied by an order of Judge Tietjens dated June 25, 1952.
2 See note 19 supra. As further illustration compare the recent decisions in Gazette Tele-
graph Co., CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 19,419, 19 T.C. No. 86 (1953) and Clarence Clark Hamlin
Trust, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 119,421, 19 T.C. No. 88 (1953). The two cases grew out of a sale
of stock in a newspaper business, the sellers, incident to the sale, executing a covenant not
to compete. In the first case the court found that the covenant was severable and the con-
sideration paid therefor was ascertainable, and it held that the cost of the covenant could
be amortized by the purchasers over its life. The second case involved tax liability of the
[Vol. 20
INTERVENTION IN TAX COURT PROCEEDINGS
ations may lie only in a common question of law, or, if there are also com-
mon questions of fact, the affected taxpayer may be satisfied with the
management of the litigation on its factual side by the taxpayer already in
court; in either event, it should suffice for the affected taxpayer to place
his views, either on the question of law or on the decision of fact to be
made, before the court through a brief amicus curiae. However, where the
issue before the court is one of fact or of mixed law and fact, and the
affected taxpayer can establish to the court's satisfaction existence of a
substantial hazard-actual or reasonably anticipated-to his interests due
to some material inadequacy in the presentation of the evidence or in the
development of the record on trial, participation of the affected taxpayer
in the proceeding would seem to be warranted as a measure for his protec-
tion. This can be achieved, if he already has pending or can commence a
proceeding reviewing his own tax liability, through a consolidation of the
proceedings. But where a notice of deficiency has not yet been issued to
the affected taxpayer, as was true in the Gulfstream Park case, interven-
tion becomes his remaining recourse. In such a situation, so far as impell-
ing reason exists for permitting intervention in response to the needs of the
affected taxpayer, it is not clear that intervention ought to be uniformly
denied for the reason stressed in the Gulfstream Park case or because of
other considerations pertaining to the functioning of the court. If, on
intervention, the court's action can be made binding for the intervenor's
tax liability, intervention may yet be appropriate. Such binding effect may
be attainable, as is suggested in later discussion of the bearing on interven-
tion of interests of the court, by requiring, as a condition to the grant of
intervention, that the party seeking it consent that his tax liability be
governed by the results of the litigation into which he is thus admitted.
Where the taxpayer is a nonpersonal entity, such as a trust or estate
or corporation, there may be some question as to the persons entitled to
represent it and to act for it in tax matters. Ambiguity or dispute in this
sellers; it was held that they realized ordinary income and not capital gain from the con-
sideration received for the covenant. It is difficult to believe that disposition of the first
case did not narrowly restrict the outcome of the second, in the absence of drastically new
evidence; indeed the court said in conclusion in the second case that "[w]e see nothing in the
record before us which would require a result inconsistent with our decision in Gazette
Telegraph Co., supra." For another pair of cases involving the same substantive problem,
see Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943) and Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948).
Further example, of a similar decisional pattern in another substantive area, is provided by
Carol F. Hall, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 119,346, 19 T.C. No. 57 (1952) (payments made to retired
partners of a firm of accountants held a distribution of firm income and not a purchase of the
interests of the retired partners, and therefore deductible from firm income by the continuing
partners); Charles R. Whitworth, 11 T.C.M. 1199 (1952) and Francis J. Clowes, 11 T.C.M.
1205 (1952) (same payments held ordinary income rather than capital gain to the retired
partners).
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regard may prompt applications for intervention by competing claimants.
In Agnes McCue,23 the Commissioner mailed three notices of deficiency to
the petitioner: one for estate tax as transferee of the estate of John J.
Nolan; another for estate tax as "statutory executrix" 24 of that estate; and
one for income tax and fraud penalty due from petitioner herself. All three
notices were founded on substantially the same facts. Nolan, a bootlegger,
was petitioner's brother, and at or prior to his death she received certain
property alleged by the Commissioner to have been owned by him. The
two estate tax notices proceeded on the theory that Nolan still had an
interest in these assets at his death, so that they were taxable as part of
his estate. The income tax notice treated those assets as income to peti-
tioner, apparently on the supposition that they had been appropriated by
her. She then brought three proceedings, one based on each of these no-
tices. A motion to intervene was made in the two estate tax cases by a
daughter of Nolan, who alleged that she had been appointed adminis-
tratrix of his estate in 1937; that she had no knowledge at that time of the
assets in question; that she had been discharged in 1940 as administratrix,
prior to the mailing of the foregoing notices of deficiency; that on learning
of these assets as a result of this tax dispute, she was, on her application,
reinstated as administratrix; and that, unless as administratrix she were
permitted to intervene, excessive tax liability might be determined against
the estate. The court denied intervention in the case involving petitioner's
transferee liability,25 on the ground that the estate had no interest in that
liability and would not be bound by determinations in that proceeding.26
But intervention was granted in the "statutory executrix" case,27 because
here the tax liability of the estate itself was in issue28 and the duly ap-
23 5 T.C.M. 141 (1946).
24 By statute a person may be treated as an executor who is "in actual or constructive
possession of any property of the decedent." Int. Rev. Code § 930(a); Estate of Henry Wilson,
2 T.C. 1059, 1083-84 (1943).
25 See order of Judge Murdock dated March 8,1944, in Agnes McCue, T.C. Docket No. 233.
2 See Transcript of Hearing at 6, Agnes McCue, T.C. Docket Nos. 233 and 234 (Mar. 8,
1944).
27 See order of Judge Murdock dated March 8, 1944, in Agnes McCue, T.C. Docket No. 234.
21 The court said that a determination of estate tax liability in this proceeding would be
binding on the estate and could not be litigated again in the future. See Transcript of Hearing,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 22-23. In the disposition of this question there was, moreover, a
conflict of interest between the petitioner and the daughter: the former primarily wanted to
prove that the assets in question did not belong to the estate, while the latter contended the
contrary so that, as a beneficiary, she might share in them. If the daughter's position pre-
vailed, she was interested, further, in the value placed on the assets; this appeared to be of
little concern to the petitioner.
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pointed representative of the estate was entitled to participate in the
litigation of that liability.29
In Louisiana Naval Stores, Inc.,30 the applicant for intervention sought
dismissal of a proceeding allegedly brought in conflict with his rights and
powers as liquidator of a corporate taxpayer. He claimed to be the duly
authorized liquidator, and contended that the petition, instituting the
proceeding, had been filed by an individual without authority to act in the
corporation's behalf. Intervention was allowed, and, on evidence pre-
sented by the intervenor, the proceeding was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction.
The liquidator may well have intervened for the taxpayer-corporation's
sake besides his own.3 Usually intervention, if opposed by the parties to
the proceeding, can be assumed to be of little benefit to them, although
Louisiana Naval Stores, Inc., indicates there are exceptions. Even where
there is no such opposition, intervention should be unnecessary for the
parties' benefit where, through the applicant for intervention, they can
obtain and present the information or evidence on which he relies.
29 Petitioner's counsel argued that the Pitts case stood against intervention by the daughter.
The reply of Judge Murdock, who wrote the opinion in the Pitts case, is informative in defining
the ruling there and its distinction here (see Transcript of Hearing, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 17-18):
"[Ilt seems to me that there is a very marked difference between that [Pitts] case and this
case, because what the F. H. Smith Company [seeking to intervene] wanted to do was to pre-
vent assets which they said belonged to the F. H. Smith Company from being taken by the
Government to pay a liability which the Government was asserting not against the F. H.
Smith Company but against Bryan Pitts [one of the taxpayers].
"The difference, to me, is that here the Government in this proceeding is asserting a
liability against the estate of John J. Nolan, and the estate of John J. Nolan wants to come in
here and protect itself. I said the F.H. Smith Company could not come in here
in the Bryan Pitts case because nobody was asserting any claim against them or anything that
belonged to them, and that if anything was taken, it would be taken because it was the property
of Pitts, and if the Government ever tried to take the property of Pitts and it actually was
taking the property of the F. H. Smith Company, there was some other tribunal in which that
could be tried out.
"But here I see a big difference, because the taxpayer whose liability is being determined
here is the very person who wants to intervene. In other words, the question here is, who is the
proper representative of the estate which is being held for these taxes?
"It has been asserted against the person [Agnes McCue] whom you represent as if she were
the proper representative of that estate. Mr. Savoy [the daughter's counsel] comes in here and
says, 'I represent the person who really is the proper fiduciary representative of this estate, and
that person has an interest in it.'
"It may be that for some other reason he should not intervene, but I do not think the
Pitts case is going to help you."
30 18 B.T.A. 533 (1929). Cf. Falls City Pontiac Co., 15 T.C. 977 (1950), aff'd, 194 F 2d
536 (C.A. 6th, 1952).
31 Cf. Gladys T. Pitts, 26 B.T.A. 312, 313 (1932), in which intervention was asked in part
because the court "will not be able to determine the correct tax liability of the petitioners with-
out the facts to be presented by the intervenor."
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Advancement of the Court's Functions. The aim of the court is to do jus-
tice. Within the scope of that objective comes prevention of injustice to
the applicant for intervention, and to that extent the interests of the ap-
plicant and the court overlap. The court's concern, however, extends
further. It has to consider the litigants already before it, whose claim to
just treatment procedurally and substantively is no less than that of the
prospective intervenor. And as to all these parties, it must think of the
impact of intervention on the efficiency and effectiveness with which it
executes its functions. Intervention has therefore been urged on the court
for the following reasons :32 (1) Multiplicity of proceedings will be avoided
by intervention. (2) Intervention will raise no new issues; and the pro-
ceeding will be simplified by evidence which the intervenor will introduce.
(3) The court will not be able "to completely administer justice" unless
intervention is allowed.
If multiplicity of proceedings really could be avoided through its al-
lowance, intervention would appear to be desirable, other things being
equal.33 It is not likely, however, that this advantage will follow unless
decision of the proceeding on its merits is binding on the intervenor.
Where there is doubt that the decision will have this effect, the court, as a
condition to the exercise of its discretion in favor of intervention, should
require the applicant to agree that, at least in all future federal tax litiga-
tion and perhaps in all suits involving the federal government or its agen-
cies or representatives, the decision will be binding on him as to issues
actually raised or necessarily determined in the proceeding. So, too, in the
case of a related taxpayer to whom a notice of deficiency has not yet been
issued, intervention may be granted on condition that he assent to be
bound in the future by the court's determinations in the present proceed-
ing which are pertinent to his own tax liability. To assure minimum litiga-
tion in the future, it may be advisable to require, where it is not unfair to
do so, agreement by the prospective intervenor even as to matters not in
question in the proceeding. Thus, one seeking intervention on the ground
that he will be liable as transferee might be required to consent to existence
of conditions to such liability other than presence of a deficiency in the
transferor's tax.3 4
2 See, e.g., ibid.
33 Cf. Scott v. Gearner, 197 F. 2d 93 (C.A. 5th, 1952).
34 For these conditions, see authorities cited note 8 supra. There may well be situations in
which existence of these conditions may be open to reasonable dispute; in which it would be
unfair to compel the potential transferee to surrender the opportunity for judicial considera-
tion of questions concerning their existence; and in which potential transferee liability still is
great enough to constitute a strong interest for intervention. Perhaps here the court, in allow-
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The assertion that intervention will simplify the proceeding should not
be accepted unless clearly established. Ordinarily the opposite would be
expected. Addition of parties, opening the door to additional pleadings,
evidence, examination of witnesses and pretrial and trial maneuver, can
readily make the proceeding cumbersome and protracted, enhance the
opportunity for confusion, and impede disposition of the case through
settlement. That intervention will raise no new issues seems to be of little
importance in an affirmative sense; but that the contrary is true deserves
considerable weight as a factor negating its allowance, although interven-
tion may be feasible even in the presence of some diversity of issues.35
If intervention is requested in order to introduce evidence, a showing
should be required that the evidence cannot be made available to the
litigants and, through them, to the court. A situation in which "sim-
plicity" is promoted through intervention exists where it results in dis-
missal or decision, without the need for trial, of one or more of the
controversies in a case.
Where intervention is asked to enable "complete administration of jus-
tice," particulars again are in order. Considerations already discussed are
likely to be among those largely relevant here.
Comxlusion. Whether intervention will be permitted in Tax Court pro-
ceedings appears to depend on a weighing in the particular case of the
interests affected, of the parties and of the court. Generally, intervention
seems undesirable in light of its adverse effects on the conduct and disposi-
tion of the proceeding. Only where such consequences are not present or
are overcome by other legitimate demands should intervention be allowed.
ing intervention, might compel submission for decision of the question of transferee liability
in the event it finds for the Commissioner on the initial question of tax deficiency.
31 Compare the arrangement suggested by James Ruston, 19 T.C. 284 (1952), in which,
on grant of consolidation, an issue common to all the parties was tried separately from an
issue which concerned only some of them. And compare the technique of confining interven-
tion as to certain issues only, suggested by Estate of Arthur Curtis James, CCH Tax Ct. Rep.
19,498, 19 T.C. No. 113 (1953), note 17 supra.
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